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Abstract
In the linear coinsurance problem, examined rst by Mossin (1968),
a higher risk aversion with respect to wealth in the sense of Arrow-
Pratt implies a higher optimal coinsurance rate. We show that this
property does not hold for health insurance under ex post moral haz-
ard, i.e., when illness severity cannot be observed by insurers and
policyholders decide on their health expenditures. The optimal coin-
surance rate trades o¤ a risk sharing e¤ect and an incentive e¤ect,
both related to risk aversion. JEL Codes: D1, D8, I1. Keywords:
Health insurance; ex post moral hazard; coinsurance.
Ecole Polytechnique, Department of Economics, 91128, Palaiseau Cedex, France.
Email: pierre.picard@polytechnique.edu
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1 Introduction
The linear coinsurance problem, originally examined by Mossin (1968), plays
an important role in the analysis of economic and nancial decisions under
risk, and this is for at least two reasons. Firstly, this model is suitable for
tractable comparative statics analysis, in order to study wealth and income
e¤ects on insurance demand in various settings (e.g., with or without back-
ground risk, in a static or dynamic setting, etc...). Secondly, its conclusions
can be straighforwardly adapted to the analysis of static portfolio choices
when agents can invest in one risk-free asset and in one risky asset. An
important property of this model states that the individuals degree of risk
aversion with respect to wealth in the sense of Arrow-Pratt goes hand in
hand with a higher optimal coinsurance rate: more risk averse individuals
choose a higher coinsurance rate.
In this note, we will show that this property does not hold for health insur-
ance under ex post moral hazard. There is ex post moral hazard in medical
insurance when insurers do not observe the severity of illness and policyhold-
ers may exaggerate their health care expenses - Arrow (1963), Pauly (1968)
and Zeckhauser (1970). This should be distinguished from ex ante moral
hazard that occurs when the insurance contract distorts the policyholders
incentives to make precautionary e¤orts. Linear coinsurance under ex post
moral hazard (i.e., when insurers pay the same fraction of the health care cost
whatever the individualsexpenses) has been considered by many authors,
including Zeckhauser (1970), Feldstein (1973), Arrow (1976), and Feldman
and Dowd (1991) to analyze the trade-o¤ between two conicting objectives:
providing risk coverage on one side, and incentivizing policyholders to mod-
erate their health expenses on the other side.
In order to show that ex post moral hazard breaks the link between the
degree of risk aversion and the optimal coinsurance rate, we will proceed
through a simple model, in which utility depends on wealth and health in
an additive way and where the utility derived from health is linear. Fur-
thermore, the only private information of individuals is about the severity of
their illness. All other preference parameters, including health risk exposure
and risk aversion are either observed by insurers, or rather recovered from
observable variables such as age, education, occupation, marital status or
from past loss experience. These very crude assumptions are obviously not
chosen for the sake of realism, but because they allow us to focus on the ex
2
post moral hazard problem in a simple way, without interfering with adverse
or advantageous selection issues.
It will turn out that, in this model, the positive e¤ect of absolute risk
aversion on the optimal coinsurance rate may vanish. In particular, an in-
crease in initial wealth does not a¤ect the optimal coinsurance rate even if
the policyholder displays decreasing or increasing absolute risk aversion. We
will also consider a computable example with constant absolute risk version
w.r.t. wealth. In that case, the optimal coinsurance rate does not depend
on the degree of absolute risk aversion: it is fully determined by the prob-
ability distribution of health states, independently of the policyholders risk
aversion.
The intuition for these results goes through two e¤ects of an increase
in the coinsurance rate. On one hand, for a given pattern of health care
expenses, a larger coinsurance rate o¤ers a better risk protection to risk
averse individuals: thus, the larger the degree of risk aversion, the larger the
benet drawn for this more complete risk coverage. This is the standard
channel that links together the intensity of risk aversion and the optimal
insurance coverage. On the other hand, an increase in coverage exacerbates
health care overexpenses, and ultimately this leads to an increase in the cost
borne by the policyholder. From this standpoint, coinsurance works as a
self-discipline device, and this incentive mechanism will be more benecial to
more risk averse people. When the index of absolute risk aversion increases,
the risk protection e¤ect and the incentive e¤ect push the optimal coinsurance
rate upwards and downwards, respectively.
This mechanism will be illustrated in two di¤erent ways. In Section 2, we
introduce our model of linear coinsurance under ex post moral hazard. We
show how risk protection and incentives interact in the determination of the
optimal coinsurance rate, and how both e¤ects are a¤ected by the degree of
absolute risk aversion. More specically, we also show that changes in the
policyholders wealth do not a¤ect the optimal coinsurance rate, although
they may make the policyholder more or less risk averse when absolute risk
aversion is not constant. In Section 3, we consider the case where the indi-
vidual displays constant risk aversion w.r.t. wealth: the optimal coinsurance
rate can then be explicitly calculated. It is shown that this rate is inde-
pendent from the index of absolute risk aversion: it only depends on the
probability distribution of health states. In other words, in that case, the
variations in the risk protection e¤ect and in the incentive e¤ect exactly bal-
ance each other when risk aversion change, and ultimately the coinsurance
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rate remains unchanged.
2 Optimal coinsurance under ex post moral
hazard
Let us consider an individual whose welfare depends both on monetary wealth
R and health level H, with a bi-variate von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function U(R;H). Some preliminary comments have to be made at this
stage. Many studies on economic decision-making have focused attention on
the e¤ect of risk aversion on optimal choices under risk, including insurance
coverage, nancial choices, prevention behavior and numerous other topics.
In the case of health care, the problem is further complicated by the denition
of risk aversion itself, because of the bi-variate nature of utility.
Firstly, we should distinguish the usual risk aversion for gambles on wealth
alone from multivariate risk aversion. Multivariate risk aversion has been
considered by several authors, following seminal papers by Keeney (1972) and
Richard (1975). Roughly speaking, a decision maker who faces multivariate
lotteries with "good" and "bad" outcomes for two attributes is considered
multivariate risk-averse if she prefers getting some of the "good" and some
of the "bad" to taking a chance on all of the "good" or all of the "bad". She
is multivariate risk neutral if she is indi¤erent between these two prospects
and she is risk seeking when her preferences are reversed. Multivariate risk
preferences do not depend on risk preferences for gambles on any attribute
alone. In particular, in our setting, an individual may display risk aversion
with respect to her wealth R and be multivariate risk averse or risk seeking
w.r.t. R;H.1
1In our health insurance setting, the decision maker is considered multivariate risk-
averse if for any R0 < R1 and any H0 < H1, she prefers lottery L1 which gives an even
chance for (R0; H1) or (R1; H0) to lottery L2 which gives an even chance for (R0; H0) or
(R1; H1), or, equivalently, if
1
2
U(R0; H1) +
1
2
(R1; H0) >
1
2
U(R0; H0) +
1
2
U(R1; H1):
A necessary and su¢ cient condition for multivariate risk aversion (risk seeking, risk neu-
trality) is @2U=@R@H < 0 (> 0;= 0) - see Richard (1975). Since we may simultaneously
have @2U=@R2 < 0 and @2U=@R@H > 0, a decision maker may be risk averse for gambles
on R alone and be multivariate risk seeking.
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Secondly, in an expected utility setting, the optimal choice of a decision
maker who may substitute an attribute to another one is simultaneously
a¤ected by her risk preference for gambles on each attribute alone, and by her
multivariate risk aversion. For example, when the two attributes correspond
to time-dating of wealth, multivariate risk aversion is often referred to as
correlation aversion. In that case, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
depends at the same time on atemporal risk aversion and on correlation
aversion.2
We will analyze health insurance choices in a model with a separable
utility function
U(R;H) = u(R) + v(H);
with u0 > 0; u00 < 0. Thus, the individual is assumed to be risk averse w.r.t.
wealth and bivariate risk neutral. The assumption of bivariate risk-neutrality
is not made for its realism, but - in addition to technical simplicity - because
it allows us to separate the e¤ects of risk aversion w.r.t. wealth from those
of bivariate risk averse or risk seeking preferences.3 For the sake of technical
simplicity, we also assume v(H) = H;  > 0. Hence, the marginal utility
of health is constant and equal to , which means that the individual is
risk-neutral w.r.t. health. Her Marginal Willingness to Pay for a health
improvement is
MWP =
dR
dH jU=const:
=

u0(R)
;
and, for R given, the larger , the larger this marginal willingness to pay.4
2See Bommier (2007) and Andersen et al. (2011) on the link between risk aversion w.r.t.
wealth, correlation aversion and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Many macro-
economic models postulate an additive intertemporal utility function, which corresponds
to correlation neutrality. In such a case, the atemporal risk aversion - often measured by
the index of relative risk aversion - simultaneously determines preferences among gambles
in a given period, and the propensity of the representative consumer to substitute wealth
accross time.
3Moreover, there is no consensus among health economists about the sign of the cross
derivative @2U=@R@H, and thus about whether individuals are bivariate risk averse or
risk seeking when they face gambles related to wealth and health; see Viscusi and Evans
(1990), Evans and Viscusi (1991), and Finkelstein et al. (2013).
4Hence, any change in the utility function u(R) - for instance a change in a parameter
that would make the individual more risk averse - may a¤ect the marginal willingness to
pay. However, parameter  provides one degree of freedom in the value of this marginal
willingness to pay. A non-expected utility setting, such as prospect theory, would provide
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Health may be negatively a¤ected by illness, but it increases with the
health care expenses. This is written as
H = h0   x(1 m);
where h0 is the initial health endowment, x is the severity of illness and m
is the health care expense level. Illness severity is distributed as a random
variable X over an intervall [a; b];with a > 0 and b < h0, and the parameters
of the problem are such that m 2 [0; 1]. Thus, the health level H increases
linearly from h0   x to h0 when m increases from 0 to 1.
The individuals insurance contract species that a fraction  of the mone-
tary expenses are reimbursed and that the insurance premium P is actuarial.
In what follows,  is called the co-insurance rate.5 Thus, the individuals
wealth is
R = w   (1  )m  P:
It is assumed that insurers observe all the characteristics of insurance
seekers, including their risk exposure and risk aversion. In more concrete
terms, insurers are supposed to be able to recover these information through
observable characteristics, such as age, gender or level of education.6
Let em(x; ; w; P ) denote the health expenses in state x when the individ-
ual owns initial wealth w and she has an insurance contract with coinsurance
rate  and premium P . She chooses the medical expenses that maximize her
utility. Thus, we have
em(x; ; w; P ) 2 arg max
m2[0;1]
fu(w   (1  )m  P ) + [h0   x(1 m)]g
Let us consider an interior solution where em(x; ; w; P ) 2 (0; 1) for all x,
is characterized by the rst-order optimality condition
 (1  )u0(w   (1  )em  P ) + x = 0, (1)
more exibility in order to characterize the attitude toward nancial risk, independently
from the marginal willingness to pay for a health improvement. See Abdellaoui et al.
(2007) for an experimental approach and Bleichrodt et al. (2000) for an application to
medical decision analysis.
5In the insurersterminology, the coinsurance rate is sometimes used for 1   , which
is the share of health expenses retained by the policyholder.
6Outreville (2014) surveys the empirical analysis of socio-demographic variables asso-
ciated with risk aversion.
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for all x. Di¤erentiating (1) yields the partial derivatives of function em:
em0x =   
(1  )2u00( bR) ; (2)
em0 = em1   + 1bA(1  )2 ; (3)
em0w = 11   ; (4)em0P =   11   ; (5)
where bR  bR(x; )  u0 1(x=(1  )); (6)
and bA  A( bR)   u00( bR)=u0( bR)
is the absolute risk aversion index.
We assume that there is no transaction cost, and thus the insurer charges
actuarial premiums. Hence, we have
P = E[em(x; ; w; P )];
which gives an equilibrium insurance premium P = eP (; w), with
eP 0 = E(em) + E(em0)1  E(em0P ) = E(em) + 1  E(1= bA); (7)eP 0w = E(em0w)1  E(em0P ) = ; (8)
Let bm(x; ; w)  em(x; ; w; eP (; w)); (9)
be the health care expense, after taking into account the endogenous de-
termination of the insurance premium. We may rewrite the policyholders
expected utility as
EU = E[u( bR(x; ))] + E[xbm(x; ; w))] + h0   Ex; (10)
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which is a function of . The optimal coinsurance rate  maximizes EU in
[0; 1]. Using (1) allows us to write the rst-order optimality condition for an
interior optimum  2 (0; 1) as7
@EU
@
= E
h
u0( bR)(bm  eP 0)i = 0; (11)
where bR  bR(x; ); bm  bm(x; ; w) and eP 0  eP 0(; w). Using (1) and (7)
yields
@EU
@
=

1  E

X
bm  E(bm)  
1  E(1=
bA)
= cov


1  X; bm(X; ; w)

  
(1  )2E(X)E(1=
bA) = 0; (12)
which denes the optimal coinsurance rate8.
Risk aversion a¤ects both terms in equation (12). The rst term is
cov


1  X; bm(X; ; w)

= cov(u0( bR); bm):
and it corresponds to the positive e¤ect of an increase in  due to the corre-
lation between health care expenses and the marginal utility of wealth. We
may intuitively understand the drivers of this correlation by calculating the
derivative of u0( bR)bm w.r.t. x. Using bR0x =  (1  )bm0x gives
d
dx
[u0( bR)bm] = u0( bR)bm0x   u00( bR)bm0x bm(1  )
= u0( bR)bm0x[1 + bAbm(1  )]: (13)
Hence, for a given trajectory x ! bm(X; ; w), the larger bA, the larger
d[u0( bR)bm]=dx, with a positive e¤ect on cov(u0( bR); bm), and thus a psoitive
e¤ect on @EU=@. This is the standard risk protection e¤ect of insurance:
7(11) is obtained rst by subtituting bR(x; ) = w   (1  )bm(x; ; w)  eP (; w) in EU
and then by observing that, for all x, the derivative of U with respect to m vanishes when
m = bm(x; ; w) because of equation (1). The pointwise derivative of U with respect to 
is thus written as u0( eR(x; ))[bm(x; ; w)  eP 0(; w)]. The optimal coinsurance rate cancels
the expected value of this pointwise derivative, which gives (11).
8Note that cov (X; bm(X; ; w)) > 0 because bm(x; ; w) is increasing w.r.t. x.
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wealth is redistributed toward lower income states, and the index of absolute
risk aversion measures the gain from such a redistribution of wealth across
states. However, in the present case, risk aversion also a¤ects the trajectory
x ! bm(X; ; w) through an incentive e¤ect. Using (2) allows us to rewrite
(13) as
d
dx
[u0( bR)bm] = bA(1  )2 [1 + bAbm(1  )];
which reverses the sign of the relationship between bA and d[u0( bR)bm]=dx.
The second term in equation (12) is another component of the incentive
e¤ect of coinsurance. It corresponds to the additional insurance premium
induced by the change in the policyholders behavior caused by a unit increase
in : for a marginal increase d, this additional expected net payment is
the di¤erence between the premium increase eP 0d and the increase in the
insurers expected cost for unchanged behavior E(bm)d. (7) shows that this
di¤erence is equal to eP 0 E(bm) = E(1= bA)=(1 ). Multiplying by expected
marginal utility of wealth E(u0( bR)) = E(X)=(1   ) provides the second
term of equation (12). The larger E(1= bA), the larger this net expected cost.
Put di¤erently if the policyholder is very risk averse, she will react to an
increase in the coinsurance rate by moderately increasing her health care
expenses, and the net expected cost of this adaptation will be small.
All in all, since risk aversion is a determinant of function  ! bm(x; ; w),
i.e., of the incentive e¤ects of insurance coverage, we cannot easily predict
whether more risk aversion leads to a larger or lower optimal coinsurance rate.
Going further in this direction requires making additional assumptions, as
we will do in Section 3. Here, with in mind the fact that wealth may be an
important driver of risk aversion, we may focus on the relationship between
the initial wealth w and the optimal coinsurance coe¢ cient . From the
implicit theorem, the e¤ect on  of a change in w is given by
d
dw
=  @
2EU=@@w
@2EU=@2
;
with @2EU=@2 < 0 at a maximum of EU . Hence, d=dw and @2EU=@@w
have the same sign. Using (4),(5) and (8) gives bm0w = em0w+ em0P bP 0w = 1 for all
x; ; w, and thus @[bm E(bm)]=@w = 0. Furthermore, (6) gives @E(bT )=@w =
0. We deduce that @2EU=@@w = 0, which implies d=dw = 0. Hence, an
increase initial wealth w - which, for instance, would make the individual less
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risk averse under DARA preferences - does not a¤ect the optimal coinsurance
rate.9
3 A computable example
Let us specify preferences furthermore, by assuming that the individual dis-
plays CARA preferences w.r.t. wealth. We write u(R) =   expf Rg;
 > 0; where  is the index of absolute risk aversion, and we still assume
v(H) = H;  > 0. In that case, we obtain
bR(x; ) = u0 1(x=(1  )) = 1

ln

(1  )
x

; (14)
and
em(x; ; w; P ) = w   P   bR(x; )
1   (15)
=
(w   P ) + ln
h
x
(1 )
i
(1  ) : (16)
Using eP = E[em(x; ; w; eP )] yields
eP (; w) = w + 

E

ln

X
(1  )

: (17)
and
bm(x; ; w) = em(x; ; w; eP (; w))
= w   1

ln[(1  )] + ln(x)  E[ln(X)]
(1  ) (18)
9The conclusions of Section 2 have been reached for a given value of parameter ,
and the optimal coinsurance rate may depend on  as well as on function u(R). Since
MWP = =u0(R), we may consider an exogenously given wealth level R0 as a reference
point, and dene MWP0 = =u0(R0) as the reference MWP of the individual. With
this denition, an individual is fully characterized by function u(R) that represents her
preferences among nancial gambles, by MWP0 that measures her willingness to pay for
a better health and by her initial wealth w. Our conclusion about the invariance of the
optimal coinsurance rate w.r.t. initial wealth hold for u(R) and MWP0 unchanged.
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By disregarding the constant term h0   E[X], (14) and (18) allow us to
write the individuals expected utility as
EU =  E
h
expf  bR(X; ))gi+ E[X bm(X; ; w)]
=   E[X]
(1  )
+

E[X]w   E[X]

ln[(1  )] + E[X ln(X)]  E[X]E[ln(X)]
(1  )

;
=   E[X]
(1  )
+

E[X]w   E[X]

ln[(1  )] + E[X ln(X)]  E[X]E[ln(X)]
(1  )
+
E[X]E[ln(X)]


(19)
which is maximized with respect to  2 [0; 1]. Let z = 1=(1  ). We have
EU =  E[X]z

+


fE[X]w   E[X] ln() + E[X] ln(z)
+z[E[X ln(X)]  E[X]E[ln(X)]] + E[X]E[ln(X)g (20)
Hence, z maximizes
V (z)  E[X] ln(z) + z[  E[X]]; (21)
in [1;+1), where
 = E[X ln(X)]  E[X]E[ln(X)]
= cov[X; ln(X)] > 0:
We have
V 0(z) =   E[X] + E[X]
z
;
V 00(z) =  E[X]
z2
< 0:
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and
V 0(1) =  > 0
If
 < E[X]; (22)
then V (z) is maximized over [1;+1) when
z =
E[X]
E[X]  > 1;
that is10
 =

E[X]
=
cov[X; ln(X)]
E[X]
2 (0; 1): (23)
If   E[X], then  = 1 would be an optimal corner solution, with m(x) = 1
for all x. Thus (5) is a necessary condition for an optimal interior solution to
exist. (4) shows that m(x) is increasing for such an interior solution. Thus
we have m(x) 2 (0; 1) for all x 2 [a; b] if
w 2 (w;w); (24)
where w and w are given by (4), m(a) = 0;m(b) = 1 and  = =E[X], with
w > w if
ln(b=a) < (1  ). (25)
In short, under (22),(24) and (25), we have an interior optimal solution
 = =E[X] 2 (0; 1) with m(x) 2 (0; 1) for all x. At this optimal solution,
the coinsurance rate  is independent from the index of absolute risk aversion
 and from parameter : it only depends on the probability distribution of
the illness severity X.11,12
10Note that we can also obtain (23) from (12) and (18).
11Everything else given, (24) does not hold when  is small enough. In that case, m(x)
is equal to 0 or 1 in a sub-interval of [a; b]. Thus, strictly speaking, the independence of
 from  has been established among values of  that are large enough for such corner
solutions not to be optimal.
12Note that the two terms in equation (12) may be rewritten as
cov (X=(1  ); bm(X; ; w)) = z=(1   ) and E(X)E( bT )=(1   )2 =
E(X)(z   1)=(1   ). Hence, in the CARA case, both terms are proportional to
the index of absolute risk tolerance 1=, so that  does not a¤ect the optimal coinsurance
rate. In addition, both terms are independent from  (which may not be the case in the
more framework considered in Section 2) and, consequently, the optimal coinsurance rate
 does not depend on .
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4 Conclusion
Risk aversion may depend on several parameters, including wealth, age, mar-
ital status and occupation, among others. Consider the case of a background
risk, such as business interruption, assumed to be uninsurable and in force
for self-employed people, but not for employees. Under risk vulnerability,
such a background risk makes the individual more averse to other indepen-
dent risks, including health care expenditures. If insurance expenses were
perfectly monitored by the insurer, then this background risk would increase
the coinsurance rate for health care. In other words, everything else given,
self-employed people should choose a more complete health insurance than
employees. This may not be the case under ex post moral hazard.
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